Introduction
Both casual observation and empirical evidence suggest that the exchange of technological information between engineers and scientists employed by different firms is a common and widespread phenomenon. A number of studies have found that it plays an important role in the development and dissemination of technical knowledge. von Hippel (1987) reports that informal know-how trading is extensive in semiconductor manufacturing, aerospace, and steel minimill industries in the United States. According to Rogers (1982, p. 106 ), exchange of information between employees of different firms constitutes "a dominant and distinguishing characteristic of the environment" in the microprocessor industry of the Silicon Valley. Schrader (1991) reports the results of a survey of technical managers indicating that 85% of all respondents have been asked for specific technical information by colleagues working for other firms, and only 2% had never provided the requested information. According to this survey, information received from colleagues working for other firms ranked as the second-most important source of technical knowledge in the steel minimill industry. Only information obtained from colleagues within the same firm was on average seen to be more important.
The empirical studies raise two important questions. First, do the firms benefit from this information exchange, or are they negatively affected? Second, how and to what extent can the firms control it? According to these studies, it is hard or even impossible to monitor such information exchange or control it directly. There are two main reasons for this. On the one hand, a large number of communication channels-including electronic and published media, conferences, meetings, and trade shows-are available to the employees. On the other hand, schemes of the first (second) class induce an employee to take a certain effort and agree (refuse) to participate in information exchange with probability 1.
To prevent its employee from participating in information exchange, a firm has to incorporate relative performance evaluation in the compensation structure and make payments to the employee contingent on the qualities of its and the other firm's products. The employee receives lower payments when the two products are of the same or similar qualities, because such similarity indicates that information exchange could have taken place.
Interestingly, optimal incentive schemes that induce an employee to participate in information exchange in most cases also use relative performance evaluation, but for a different reason. It reduces the employee's free-riding on the other employee's effort, and therefore lowers the firm's cost of eliciting effort under information exchange.
Direct forms of relative performance evaluation are not very common in the real world. However, when a firm's profits depend on the qualities of both firms' products, it can achieve the same result by offering a compensation scheme contingent on the quality of the employee's product and the firm's profits. This conclusion suggests an important reason why firms commonly offer profit-sharing plans, such as incentive stock options, to their engineering and research staff. Profit sharing may be the key instrument allowing the firms to control information exchange between their employees. Accordingly, the increasing popularity of incentive stock options may be complementary to the dramatic increase in employees' communication abilities via the Internet and other electronic media.
To reiterate the point, I do not mean to suggest that firms will or can prevent any exchange of information between employees across firms. However, it is a concern for firms that such communication would not be limited to general nonproprietary information and knowledge, but would also involve sharing specific and valuable information about current innovations and products. I demonstrate that by designing compensation schemes appropriately, firms can regulate the exchange of such information. Under what conditions the firms will prevent or encourage it, and hence when the spillover of proprietary information will or will not take place, are the central issues explored here.
A number of factors influence a firm's decision whether or not to prevent information exchange. Let us start from the cost of providing incentives to employees. To prevent information exchange, a firm has to use relative performance evaluation and, therefore, bear an additional cost of compensating risk-averse employees for a higher variance in the reward structure. On the other hand, under information exchange an employee can free-ride and use the R&D results of the other employee as her own. This free-riding has a negative effect on the employee's effort and raises the firm's cost of eliciting it. In most cases, the free-riding effect dominates and makes preventing information exchange more attractive for the firm. This effect is also very strong when the employees are risk neutral but have limited liability.
Due to its reciprocal nature, information exchange will not occur if just one of the firms prevents its employees from participating in it. The second firm can free-ride on the first firm in the provision of incentives and avoid both the cost of preventing information exchange and the cost associated with its employee's free-riding. This second firm incurs the lowest possible cost of inducing effort. Therefore, the firms will use asymmetric strategies whenever information exchange is prevented with probability 1. This result fits very well with the observation that a variety of compensation schemes for engineers and technical employees is typically used in the high-tech industries. Obviously, each firm would prefer to be in the position of the free-rider, which gives rise to a coordination problem. Failure of coordination between firms may result in mixedstrategy equilibria in which each firm prevents its employees from participating in information exchange with some probability.
Although cost considerations play an important role in determining whether information exchange does or does not occur, the key factor is the nature of the firms' interaction in the product market. Not surprisingly, I find that information exchange is prevented when competition between the firms is intense. When firms compete head-to-head in the market, eliminating the spillover of innovations is critically important, because it gives each firm a chance to attain technological leadership and take the upper hand in the competition.
Somewhat more surprisingly, information exchange is also prevented when an innovation developed by one firm can easily be imitated by the other firm. In this case, information sharing between the employees does not generate any benefit for the firms, while preventing it eliminates the employees' free-riding and therefore reduces the firms' cost of inducing effort. Thus, we should expect that information exchange will be prevented in environments where patent protection is weak or imitation is easy.
On the other hand, in many situations the firms benefit from information exchange between the employees, because it gives them an indirect access to the R&D results of the other firms and, net of the free-riding effect, makes their employees more knowledgeable and productive. The benefits of information exchange dominate when competition between the firms is not intense. In particular, information exchange will take place when the firms serve different markets or produce differentiated products.
Still, the employees' free-riding on each other's effort reduces the benefit of information exchange and may offset it completely, especially if the employees enjoy limited liability. In the latter case, even in the absence of competition between the firms, information exchange will take place only if the premium that the market pays for high quality is not too large.
The issues of information sharing in R&D and incentives for knowledge transfer have been previously studied in the literature, particularly in the context of licensing (e.g., d 'Aspremont, Bhattacharya, and GCrard-Varet, 2000; Bhattacharya, Glazer, and Sappington, 1992; Katz and Shapiro, 1987) , and research joint ventures (e.g., d ' Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Katz, 1986; Kamien, Muller, and Zang, 1992) . The diffusion of R&D information is discussed by Reinganum (1989) . This article can be seen as complementary to the existing literature. It examines knowledge transfer that takes place at an intermediate stage of the R&D process in the presence of asymmetric information, and it explores alternative channels for it that arise in the agency context. Thus, this article offers an endogenous explanation of information spillovers that are not subject to the firms' control. R&D spillovers controlled by the firm have been studied by Choi (1993) and De Fraja (1993) .
This article is also related to the literature on cooperation between agents working for the same principal (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1990; Itoh, 1991 Itoh, , 1993 Macho-Stadler and Perez, 1993; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1991) . This literature examines optimal incentives to induce cooperation and demonstrates that cooperation not only brings technological advantages, but also allows the agents to share risk, and therefore reduces the firm's cost of providing incentives (Itoh, 1993; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 199 1) . The situation considered in this article is different, because information is a public good and the agents incur no direct cost when they exchange it. They would cooperate unless induced not to do so by the firms. The problem here is too much cooperation, rather than too little.
This article also contributes to our understanding of collusion and strategic-delegation problems. In the case of observable contracts, delegation has been studied by Fershtman and Judd (1987) , Spencer and Brander (1983) , Brainard and Martimort (1996) , Kiihn (1997) , and others. For more on collusion, see Laffont and Martimort (1998) .
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 characterizes optimal incentive schemes. Section 4 establishes the existence of equilibria and characterizes equilibrium outcomes. In Section 5 , I consider the case where the employees are risk neutral but have limited liability.
Model
Two firms, A and B, operate in the market. Each firm hires an employee (an engineer or researcher) to undertake R&D and developldesign a new product. An employee is referred to as "she" and is also indexed by A or B. The new product can be of high (02)or low (8,) Consequently, if employees A and B explore subsets of measure p and q respectively and exchange information, both products will be of high quality with probability 1 -( 1 -p)(l -q ) ,and of low quality with the complementary probability.
The specific modelling assumptions regarding information exchange are introduced for several reasons. First, as mentioned above, they reflect the stylized facts described in the empirical literature. Second, there are natural justifications for making them. Third, they make the model tractable.
Reciprocity of information exchange is a norm in the high-tech industry. According to Rogers (1982, p. 114) , the rule of the game is that "information must be given in order for it to be obtained." An obvious reason why information has to be exchanged rather than bought or sold is the difficulty of negotiating a payment for it. Another reason lies in the legal and contractual restrictions that prohibit selling information. When the penalties are sufficiently large, an employee may be reluctant to sell information even if the probability of detection is smalL2 Selling information may also have a negative effect on an employee's reputation.
Reputational effects and technological indivisibilities can explain why information cannot be distorted or disclosed partially. Since new product designs become observable when they are brought to the market, the fact that a person has presented incomplete or distorted information to a colleague will be detected eventually, which can cause other colleagues to suspend future cooperation with the "cheat." Refusal to share information is not likely to have such an effect, since it will not be seen as "cheating." In high-tech industries, especially computer-related ones, reputational considerations can play an important role because informal relations between the employees typically last much longer than a spell of employment with a particular firm.3 But although individual reputations are long-lived, high worker mobility can make it difficult to sustain more complex intertemporal patterns of cooperation, for example, such that the employees do not exchange information but alternate between receiving and providing information ~n i l a t e r a l l~.~ On the other hand, technological indivisibilities can make distorting information too costly, as it may require running another set of experiments, designing another product, or writing another computer program.
The assumption that the value of information is uncertain at the time of exchange is quite natural, because the value of information depends on the quality of the product developed on its basis. Often, the quality of a new product can be recognized only after it is brought to the market. Another way to justify this assumption is to note that an employee typically has knowledge about only a part of a new product or process, and the extent to which her knowledge is valuable depends on the design of the other parts.
Let me now turn to the contractibility assumptions. I assume that a firm can offer an incentive scheme that is contingent on qualities of both products. Equivalently, payments to an employee can be contingent only on the firm's profits if there is a one-to-one relation between the firm's profits and the qualities of both products or, if this relation is not one-to-one, on the firm's profits and the quality of the employee's product. Accordingly, incentive schemes offered by firms A and B can be represented by 4-tuples of utility levels ( u~~, 1/22? 1/12, 1/11)and (u21, ~2 2 , 1 2 , U I~) respectively. Table 2 summarizes the payoffs that the employees get when they do and do not exchange information.
Optimal incentive schemes
Turning to the formal analysis of the model, consider, at first, the employees' behavior in the continuation game after they have accepted the incentives schemes. It is shown in the Appendix that any optimal strategy of employee A (B) can be represented as a triple (pc, pnc,6) E [O, 113 ((qc,qnc,o ) E [O, 113) ,which stands for the following. With probability 6 (o) employee A (B) takes effort p C(qC)and agrees to exchange information. With probability 1 -6 (1 -a ) employee A (B) takes effort pnc (qnc)and refuses to exchange information. Now let us consider the firms' problem. Suppose that firm A offers incentive scheme (~21, 1/22? 1/12, vII), and employee A (B) follows strategy (pc,pnc,6) ((qc, q".C,0)). Let p = pC6+ pnC(l-6) and ij = q c o + qRC(1 -o). Then firm A's expected payoff is equal to
The incentive scheme offered by firm A is optimal if it maximizes (I) taking into account that employee A's strategy maximizes her payoff given this incentive scheme. Since the contracts are unobservable by a third party, firm A's incentive scheme cannot affect the strategy of employee B. Similarly, neither firm A nor employee A observes the incentive scheme offered by firm B or employee B's strategy, although in equilibrium firm A and employee A share the same beliefs about them. Therefore, firm A's profit-maximization problem can be decomposed into two parts:5 (i) Cost minimization: For any strategy (pC,pnC, 6), derive an incentive scheme that induces employee A to follow this strategy at the minimal expected cost to firm A under given beliefs about employee B's strategy.
(ii) Profit maximization: Using the cost function derived in the first step, find an optimal strategy (pc, pnc,6) that maximizes firm A's expected profits.
Naturally, the same applies to the optimal strategy of firm B. In the remainder of this section I will characterize optimal incentive schemes by solving the cost-minimization part of the firm's problem. Since the two firms are identical, the discussion will focus on firm A.
Let us, at first, introduce one important simplification. Suppose it is optimal for firm A to offer incentive scheme Z = { u~~, 1/22,1/12, 1/11} that induces its employee to randomize by choosing strategy (pc, p"", 6) s.t. 6 E (0, 1). Obviously, employee A gets the same payoff whether she takes effort p Cand agrees to exchange information (action C), or takes effort pnCand refuses to exchange information (action NC). Firm A must also be indifferent between these two actions of its employee, because otherwise incentive scheme Z would not be optimal for it. To see this, suppose that firm A gets a strictly higher payoff when its employee takes action NC. Then it would be optimal for firm A to increase 1/21 (~12) slightly if pnc 2 p c (p"" < pc). Inspection of (Al) and (A2) in the Appendix reveals that this modification induces employee A to refuse to exchange information and to choose an effort close to pnc.Similarly, if firm A obtains a higher payoff when employee A takes action C, then it would be optimal for this firm to prevent information exchange by increasing 1/22 slightly when pcq + a((1 -pc)qc + p C ( l -qC)) > pnCq, and increasing 1/11 slightly in the opposite case.
This method is due to Grossman and Hart (1983) This observation implies that an employee's randomiz,ation can be replaced by its firm's randomization in the following way. Let Z 'and Z"be two identical copies of incentive scheme Z. Suppose that employee A takes action C when offered Z'and takes action NC when offered Z". Obviously, these strategies are optimal for the employee, and firm A is indifferent between offering Z 'or 1". If it offers Z' with probability 6 and Z"with probability 1 -6, then the induced distribution of employee A's actions does not change. Thus, we can assume without loss of generality that the employee never randomizes in the decision to exchange or not to exchange information, and can restrict the analysis to two classes of incentive schemes. Incentive schemes of class CC (NC) minimize the firm's expected cost of inducing the employee to take the desired effort and agree (refuse) to exchange information. In the sequel, we will continue to use the notation (pC, pnC, 6 ) to describe the employee's strategy with the understanding that it should be interpreted as follows: with probability 6 (1 -6) the firm offers incentive scheme of class CC (NC) inducing the employee to agree (refuse) to exchange information and take effort p C (pnc). The following lemma summarizes this discussion.
Lemma 1. Without loss of generality, any incentive scheme offered by a firm belongs to either class CC or class NC.
A typical element of class NC is incentive scheme NC(p qC, q'7C, a ) , which minimizes the firm's cost of inducing its employee to take effort p and refuse to exchange information given the strategy (qC, qnc, a ) of the other employee. This incentive scheme is characterized in the following lemma. Obviously, an employee would be willing to exchange information if her payoff depended only on the quality of her product, i.e., if 1121 = 1122 and 1/12 = 1111. To eliminate the incentives for information exchange, the firm has to offer higher payments when the two products are of different qualities and set 1/21 > v22 and 1/12 > 1111. This has the desired effect, because the products can be of different qualities only if no information exchange has taken place. Thus, relative performance evaluation is necessary to prevent information exchange between the employees. It has been demonstrated (Itoh, 1991; Macho-Stadler and Pkrez, 1993 ) that relative performance evaluation can induce cooperation between the employees. Here it serves the opposite goal.
Next, I characterize incentive schemes of class C C . Let C C ( p 1 q C , qnC, a ) be the incentive scheme that minimizes the firm's cost of inducing its employee to take effort p and agree to exchange information given that the other employee follows strategy (qC, qnC, a ) . Proof. See the Appendix.
The proof shows that 1/21 = v22 if and only if a = 0 or 1,while 1/12= 1/11 if a = 0 or 1, or if the employee strictly prefers to exchange information. Thus, relative performance evaluation is also optimal when the firm encourages information exchange. This may appear surprising, because an employee will certainly agree to exchange information if her compensation depends only on the quality of her product. Yet such an incentive scheme is not optimal.
The firm sets v21 > 1122, because an increase in v21 is a more cost-effective way to induce effort than an increase in 1 / 2 2 To demonstrate this formally, let Q(v21) (Q(v22) ) be the ratio of the coefficient on h ( v z l ) (h(u22) ) in the firm's expected cost function to the coefficient on 1/21 (v22) in the employee's incentive constraint (see the Appendix). This ratio reflects the firm's marginal cost of inducing effort via the corresponding element of the incentive scheme. We have i.e., the firm gets a bigger "bang for the b u c k by increasing v21. The effect of an increase in 1/22 on effort is smaller, because as a result of information exchange employee A obtains payment 1/22 even if her own design is of low quality, but employee B's design is of high quality. Therefore, employee A can exert a low effort but free-ride on the other employee's effort and still have a good chance of earning 1122.
On the other hand, an employee cannot obtain 1/21 by free-riding. She gets this payoff only if she develops a high-quality product, and the other employee refuses to exchange information but ends up developing a low-quality product. It follows that setting 1/21 > 1/22 is optimal. However, an employee who has taken a sufficiently high effort may refuse to share information if 2121-1/22 is sufficiently large. To prevent this and to ensure that information exchange remains more profitable for the employee, the firm may have to set 1/12 < 1/11. Although the discontinuity of G n C ( p q c , qnc, a ) at a = 0 could potentially create equilibrium existence problems, this does not happen because the discontinuity occurs at an irrelevant point of the action space. This is demonstrated in the proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix.
A firm's revenue is linear in its employee's effort. However, Gf"(p I .) and G C ( pI .) are not necessarily convex in p on all the domain. Therefore, in equilibrium the firms may have to randomize between several incentive schemes of the same class. Since the expected payoffs of a firm and its employee depend only on the expected values of the other employee's strategy, such randomization does not cause any changes in my analysis. However, we need to bear in mind that q Cand qnCin G n c ( p( q C , qnc, o ) and NC(q2 .)by choosing the first incentive scheme with probability t E (0, 1 ) s.t. q' = t q l + ( l -t)q2,then the payoffs of firm A and its employee depend only on q'.
in the product market. This analysis provides an endogenous explanation of the spillover effect in the R&D. Existence of an equilibrium will be established differently in two separate cases. In the case n 2 2 < n l z , pure-strategy equilibria will be exhibited in Proposition 3. In the case 1722 > n l 2 , a general existence proof is provided in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose that n 2 2 > n l 2 . Then there exists an equilibrium in the incentive-scheme game between the firms.
Proo$ See the Appendix.
Before attempting to characterize the equilibria, let us review the factors determining whether the firm prevents its employee from participating in information exchange. Clearly, each firm benefits from such information exchange, because it provides an indirect access to the results of R&D performed at the other firm. However, this benefit may be outweighed by the other factors.
On the cost side, an employee's free-riding on information provided by the other employee raises the firm's effective cost of effort under information exchange. At the same time, when the employees are risk averse, a firm preventing information exchange incurs an extra cost of compensating its employee for the additional variability in the payoff structure generated by the relative performance evaluation. In most cases, the first effect dominates the second effect.
Yet the factor that plays the most important role in determining whether information exchange does or does not occur is the nature of the firms' interaction in the product market. Analyzing all possible market structures would be too cumbersome. Instead, in several propositions below I examine a number of interesting economic environments, which allows me to draw sufficiently general conclusions about the incidence of information exchange.
I use ratio R = (nzln 2 2 ) / ( n 2 2 -n12)to measure the competitiveness of the environment and the tradeoff that affects the decision whether to prevent or to encourage information exchange. The numerator of R can be interpreted as a premium for the technological leadership. It represents the benefit of preventing information exchange for the firm whose employee develops a high-quality product when the competitor's employee fails to develop such a product. On the other hand, the denominator of R represents the benefit of information exchange for the firm when its employee fails to develop a high-quality product and the other firm's employee succeeds in this. Intuitively, it is clear that the firm has stronger incentives to prevent information exchange when R is high. This intuition is confirmed in the following two propositions. Proposition 1. Information exchange is prevented with a positive probability if R > 1.
To understand this proposition, suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which information exchange takes place with probability 1. Without loss of generality, in this equilibrium with a positive probability employee A takes effort p that is (weakly) higher than employee B's expected effort q e .Then firm A can get a higher payoff by deviating and preventing information exchange. Its cost of inducing effort p will go down, because the cost reduction from eliminating the employee's free-riding dominates the additional cost of preventing information exchange. At the same time, R > 1 implies that firm A's expected revenue will go up. To see this, combine p 2 q" with the fact that the maximal possible benefit of information exchange n 2 2 -n l 2 is less than the premium for technological leadership n 2 1 -1722.
The condition R > 1 may not be sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium in which information exchange is prevented with probability 1,because the firms could randomize between incentive schemes of classes CC and NC. However, as R increases, the premium for the technological leadership becomes sufficiently high compared to the benefit of information exchange. Beyond a certain point, a firm would rather incur the cost of preventing information exchange than randomize and miss a chance to become a technological leader. This is the intuition behind the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let n 2 2 -rill > K , and max{nzl, n 2 2 } < K,for some K , K such that 0 < -K , K < oo.Then 3 k 1 0 s.t. if R > k, then there exists an equilibrium in which information exchange is prevented with probability 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In an equilibrium with no information exchange, only one firm offers an incentive scheme of classNC that uses relative performance evaluation. The other firm free-rides and offers an incentive scheme of class CC in which, according to Lemma 3, the payments to the employee depend only on the quality of this employee's product. This result helps to explain the nonuniformity of compensation schemes across the firms in the same industry. It also suggests that the firm that commits to a compensation structure earlier, say, due to its incumbency position, can free-ride and save the cost of preventing information exchange. The incumbent firm would offer an incentive scheme consisting of a base salary and quality premia, whereas a recent entrant would have to offer a profit-sharing plan to its employees to prevent information exchange. Although there may be multiple equilibria, equilibria of this type have a focal nature because neither firm randomizes between incentive schemes of different classes.
Next, let us consider differentiated Bertrand competition. In this case, a firm earns positive profits when the quality of its product is different from the quality of the competitor's product, and zero profits otherwise. Such a payoff structure is characteristic of markets where the firms compete by setting prices and the consumers differ in their willingness to pay for quality. The firm offering a high-(low-)quality product captures the upper (lower) end of the market when the competitor offers a product of different quality. Formally, the payoffs are ordered in the following way:
Proposition 3. In the case of differentiated Bertrand competition, there exists an equilibrium in which information exchange is prevented with probability 1.
Proof See the Appendix.
By Lemma 2, the firm that prevents information exchange offers an incentive scheme with the following reward structure: vzl 1 v22 > ~1 2 > v11. In the context of differentiated Bertrand competition, a payment to the employee in this incentive scheme can be represented as a sum of two parts: (i) a quality premium and (ii) a share of profits.
Let vll be the base pay. Then v22 -U I1 is a premium for a high-quality product. Increment
is a share of profit n 2 l paid when the firm captures the high end of the market, and increment 1112 -v11 is a share of profit 3712 paid when the firm captures the low end of the market. When the firm delivers a product of the same quality as its competitor, it does not earn any profits, and therefore the employee does not get any payoff from profit sharing.
Thus, in contrast to standard moral hazard arguments, this article suggests that the firms may be offering profit sharing not to elicit effort, but rather to regulate information flows and prevent the spillover of information through communication between the employees. When information exchange is not a concern, effort could be elicited more effectively by offering performancerelated bonuses that are not based on relative performance evaluation. The most common and popular methods of profit sharing are incentive stock options and employee stock purchase plans (known as ISOP and ESPP). Since the stock price normally reflects the firm's profitability and its relative performance vis-A-vis its competitors, these stock plans can generate the desired incentive effect and prevent an employee from sharing critical information.
Let us now consider environments where competition between the firms is less intense. At first, suppose that a firm can duplicate or reengineer an innovation developed by the other firm without violating the patents or other intellectual property rights. In the high-tech industry, "inventing around a patent" is commonly used to reproduce inventions legitimately in a modified form. In this case, the following result holds.
Proposition 4. Suppose that a firm can reengineer an innovation developed by the competitor at a sufficiently small cost. Then there exists an equilibrium in which information exchange between the employees is prevented with probability 1.
Prooc When a firm can reengineer an innovation at zero cost, the payoffs have the following structure: 1721 = n22 = nl2 1 rill. In this case, existence of an equilibrium in which information exchange is prevented with probability 1 can be established by modifying the proof of Proposition 2. If a firm incurs cost c > O to reengineer an innovation, inspection of the proof of Proposition 2 shows that the result holds by continuity as long as c is sufficiently small.
Q.E.D.
The intuition behind this result is easy to understand. Suppose that firm B does not prevent information exchange, and consider the tradeoff that firm A faces in this case. The value of learning about firm B's innovation through information exchange does not exceed the cost c of reengineering it. At the same time, by preventing information exchange the firm reduces its cost by a positive amount, because the additional cost of relative performance evaluation is strictly less than the eliminated cost of the employee's free-riding. Then preventing information exchange is optimal for firm A as long as c is sufficiently small.
Finally, suppose that the two firms operate in different markets separated either geographically or through product differentiati~n.~ In this case, a firm's revenue will not be significantly affected by the quality of the other firm's product. To measure the degree to which the revenue of one firm is independent of the other firm's product I use ratio K I -ma x{ n21 -n22 1, 1 n12 -T II I } / (n21-TIl). Let us say that the market interaction between the firms is weak (strong) if K I is small (large).8 Then the following result holds.
Proposition 5. If the market interaction between the firms is sufficiently weak, i.e., K I is small enough, then information exchange takes place with probability 1 in all equilibria.
Proot See the Appendix.
When the market interaction between the firms is weak, information exchange produces a significant benefit on the revenue side because it raises the probability that the firm delivers a highquality product without diluting the value of its own innovation. This positive effect outweighs the negative effect of information exchange on the cost of eliciting effort. Note that coefficient R is also small when k I is small, but the opposite is not true.
It is straightforward to extend this proposition to show that information exchange also takes place in the following two cases: (i) negative externality on the "loser": 1721 -n22 is small and nl2 < rill ; (ii) positive externality on the "loser": n21 -1722 is small, n22 > nl;? 1 rill, and rill is not too low. In the first case, the proof of Proposition 5 applies without change, while in the latter case a simple modification of the proof is needed.
It is interesting to consider the relation between information exchange and licensing. Licensing allows the firms to share the results of R&D expost, as the licensing firm (licensor) grants the other firm (licensee) the right to use its innovation in exchange for a fee. In our context, the licensor is the firm with a high-quality product and the licensee is the firm with a low-quality product. They earn n2l and nl2 respectively in the absence of licensing. If the innovation underlying the high-quality product is licensed, both firms earn 1722 in the market. Therefore, licensing is efficient when S -2 n22 -1721 -nl2 1 0, i.e., R E (172~-n22)/(7r22-n12)< 1. S represents the surplus from licensing. Since licensing must be beneficial for both firms, the licensing fee must be equal to as,where a E [0, 11, implying that the benefit to the licensee is (1 -a)S. Then licensing has the following effect on the firms' profits: 1121 = 1721 + a s , 1112 = n12 + (1 -a)S, while n22 and rill remain unchanged. As a result, the coefficient R, which prior to licensing is less than one, becomes ~( a ) = (n21--n12 -(1 -n22 + a S ) / [~r~~ a)S] = 1 for any a . Proposition 1 implies that in this case information exchange is prevented with a positive probability.
Also assume that reengineering an innovation is impossible. In the limit when KI = 0, we have n 2 1 = K22 > n 1 2 = TI I O RAND 2001.
Since licensing reduces the benefit of information exchange, intuition suggests that the firms would see them as substitutes. The results of the article can be used to confirm this intuition in the following case. Suppose that the market payoffs satisfy the conditions of Proposition 5 or its extensions. Then in the absence of licensing, information exchange will occur with probability 1, whereas if licensing takes place, information exchange will be prevented with a positive probability because ~( a )1.
=

Limited liability
In this section I consider the case of risk-neutral employees who have limited liability, so that all payments by the firms must be nonnegative. In this case, it becomes possible to compute the firms' cost functions explicitly and isolate the factors discussed in the previous sections. More important, there are certain differences between the results of this and previous sections, which implies that limited liability can have important implications for information exchange.
For simplicity, let us also assume that an employee's reservation utility level g is equal to zero. Then we can compute the following cost functions (see the Appendix):
Since the employees are risk neutral, the variability in the payoff structure has no effect on their expected payoffs. Therefore, preventing information exchange is not costly for a firm, and we exchange can be sustained in equilibrium only if this additional cost does not exceed the expected benefit that the firms get from access to each other's innovations. In this section I shall study how this tradeoff is resolved in different situations. The analysis will focus on the existence of a "cooperative" equilibrium in which the probability of information exchange is equal to one. For technical convenience, I assume that D"'(p) > 0. Under this assumption, if a "cooperative" equilibrium exists, it is unique and symmetric. In it, each firm earns the following payoff:
where "cooperative" effort pc induced by each firm solves This will be an equilibrium outcome if and only if no firm has an incentive to deviate and prevent information exchange, i.e., U c ( p c , p C ) 2 lJnc(pd, pc), where
SEVERINOV 1 555 pd is the optimal "noncooperative" effort for the deviator. It solves
The following necessary conditions for the existence of a "cooperative" equilibrium are derived from UC(pC, pC) UfZC(pC, -pC)> 0. To obtain the second condition I also use (2).
Condition 1 simply says that the benefit of information exchange for the firm must be greater than the extra cost generated by the employees' free-riding. Note that the cost of free-riding is negligible when p C is low, but it grows at a faster rate than pC. Therefore, the "cooperative" equilibrium fails to exist when p C is sufficiently high.
Since p C is endogenous, Condition 2 provides a useful extension of Condition 1. It depends exclusively on the parameters of the problem, i s . , the market payoffs and the cost function. According to Condition 2, cooperative equilibrium fails to exist when n22 -rill is sufficiently large, because in this case p C and, hence, the cost of free-riding are high. Thus, cooperative equilibrium may fail to exist even if n22 > nzl > nl2, i.e., when there are obvious gains to cooperation.
Let us now turn to the sufficient conditions. We have the following proposition. 
Condition (i) guarantees that p C and p" are sufficiently low, so that free-riding costs are small. Conditions (ii) and (iii) together ensure that the positive effect of information exchange on the firm's revenue is sufficiently large.
The necessary conditions indicate that despite the benefits of information exchange on the revenue side, the cooperative equilibrium may still be nonsustainable due to a high cost of freeriding. To get a better understanding of this issue, consider the following case where the benefit of information exchange is obvious: n22 = 1721 = nH and n12 = rill = n~. By Proposition 5, in the absence of limited liability exchange of information always takes place under the payoff structure considered in Proposition 7. The result of Proposition 7 is different because the cost of free-riding is higher under limited liability. To overcome free-riding and stimulate effort, the firm can either raise the payments to the employee for a high-quality product or lower the payments for a low-quality product. Under limited liability, the second option is no longer available, and the firm has to raise the rewards for high quality, which leads to higher costs. As p C increases, the cost of free-riding explodes because it grows at a faster rate than D'(pc). Therefore, when riff -n~ and hence p C are sufficiently high, it becomes less costly for the firm to achieve the same probability of innovation that is obtained under information exchange, namely p C+p C ( l-pC), by preventing information exchange and inducing the employee to take this effort on her own.
To summarize, Proposition 7 demonstrates that in the agency framework, information exchange could lead to such high levels of free-riding that it becomes optimal to prevent cooperation even if the firms do not compete in the market. This implication is quite intriguing because it casts doubt on the classical proposition that cooperation in R&D improves efficiency.
Proposition 7 has another important implication. Consider a family of cost functions t D ( p )
indexed by t > 0, where D ( p ) satisfies the condition of Proposition 7. t can be interpreted as a measure of technical complexity of R&D. Since pCdecreases in t , Proposition 7 can be used to show that "cooperative" equilibrium exists when t is sufficiently large and fails to exist when t is small. Thus, information exchange is more likely in industries where technical problems are highly complex and R&D is very costly, so that a typical firm cannot afford the expenses required to ensure a high probability of discovering an innovation. On the other hand, when R&D costs are low, it is more cost-effective for the firm to pay its employees for a high effort rather than encourage information exchange. Although this logic may appear straightforward, the intuition relies on the fact that the free-riding costs rise at a faster rate than an employee's effort.
Conclusions
In recent years, firms in the high-tech industries have adopted many innovative compensation methods. One unorthodox approach proposed recently is to give the employees stock options in competing firms and in customer firms.9 This article suggests that such trends in compensation could be complementary to the dramatic increase in the employees' communication abilities that have been expanded by the Internet and other electronic media.
A classical proposition in the R&D literature is that a lack of cooperation causes duplication and excessive levels of R&D, and is detrimental for efficiency. This article suggests that an agency structure of the firms can be responsible for lack of cooperation, even if on the revenue side there are obvious benefits from cooperation for all participants.
This research can be extended in several directions. First, in certain environments information exchange may involve partial or one-sided revelation of information and/or side payments between employees. Second, employees could also coordinate their efforts ex ante and avoid duplication prior to information exchange. Third, it would be interesting to consider the environments with many firms where the issues of coalition formation arise and additional incentives for information exchange may be present, such as not being left out of cooperation involving other firms and their employees.
Appendix
Proofs of Lemmas 2 4 , Propositions 1-3 and 5-7, Theorem 1, and a characterization of the employees' optimal strategies follow.
Characterization of the employees' optimal strategies. Suppose that employee B uses strategy ( F B (~) , ( q ) ) ,
where FB(q)denotes probability distribution over efforts, and ~( q ) stands for the probability that employee B agrees to exchange information when she takes effort q. Employee B's expected effort is equal to ij = & q d F( q ) ,the unconditional probability that she agrees to exchange information is CT = J; t
( q ) d F B ( q ) ,
and her expected effort given that she agrees (refuses) to exchange information is equal to qC= ( 1 1~~)
Given employee B's strategy, employee A obtains the following expected payoffs when she takes effort p: (i) If she refuses to exchange information,
(ii 
,employee A's unique optimal action is to take effort p' and agree to exchange information. If U C ( p C , q c , qllC, o ) < U"C(p"C, q ) , her unique optimal action is to take effort p'IC and refuse to exchange information. Finally, both actions are optimal when U C ( p C , q C , q'Ic, o ) = UnC(pn\ q ) . Let 6 denote the probability that employee A chooses the first action. It follows that the triple ( p C , p'lC, 6 ) provides a complete description of employee A's optimal strategy. The same is true for employee B.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that employee B is expected to follow strategy ( q C , q n C , o ) . scheme N C ( p q\ qnC, o ) can be derived by solving the following optimization problem:
Problem NC: ( p q c , qllc, o ) subject to the incentive constraint,
the individual-rationality constraint, and the no-collusion constraint,
The no-collusion constraints ( A 6 )and ( A 7 )guarantee that the employee does not agree to exchange information. Condition ( A 7 )is imposed as a refinement that eliminates equilibria in which the employees use weakly dominated strategies, and each of them refuses to exchange information only because she expects the other to do so. Formally, condition ( A 7 ) is necessary if the employees make small trembles in the implementation of their strategies.
I solve the problem for o > 0. In the case o = 0, the solution is similar. To show that the problem has a unique solution, let us establish that it is convex in the vector of rewards. The objective function and the individual-rationality constraint ( A S ) are obviously convex. It is also easy to show that ( A 6 ) is convex. Strict concavity of the employee's expected utility function in p implies that incentive constraint ( A 4 )can be replaced by the following first-order condition, which is linear in the rewards:
Next, let z" be the unique maximizer of the expression on the right-hand side of (A6).Differentiating the Lagrangian of this problem with nonnegative multipliers h, K , and rj on individual-rationality, incentive, and no-collusion constraints respectively, I obtain the following first-order conditions:
Let us establish that 7 > 0, i.e., constraint ( A 6 
Proof ofLemma 3. According to Lemma I, incentive scheme C C ( p q c , q'IC, o ) can be derived by solving the following constrained minimization problem.
Problem CC: ( p ( q C , qnC, o ) .
(u?l,u2?,ul?,ull) (A131
subject to the following individual-rationality, incentive, and collusion constraints:
Incentive constraint (A15)is equivalent to the following first-order condition:
To show that this problem is convex, we can use a proof similar to that of Lemma 2. Let x* be the maximizer of the right-hand side of (A16),i.e., ( v Z 1-u 
When o i1, differentiating the Lagrangian of this problem with multipliers y , p 2 0, and t respectively on the individual-rationality, incentive, and collusion constraints, we obtain the following first-order conditions:
First let us consider the case o = 0. Then ? = qnC,and by inspecting the above first-order conditions it is easy to establish the following: v21 = v22 > u12 = U I I .
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Suppose now that 0 < 5 < 1. Then there are two cases:
Then comparing (A18) and (A19) we get u21 > u22. Comparing (A20) and (A19),we obtain that u22 > u12 Finally, by (A20)and (A21), ul2 = ull.
When p > 0 ,the collusion constraint is binding and therefore ~n a x { u~~, v l 2 ) By (A20)and u 1 2 }> 1122 > ~n i n { v~~, (A21), ul1 2 ul2 (the inequality is strict when qC > 0 ) .Therefore, u21 > 1112 because otherwise the employee will choose effort p = 0. Since the coll~ision constraint is binding, 1121 > u22. Therefore, u22 > u12because otherwise the collusion constraint will fail. Then incentive constraints imply that x" > p. Comparing (A18) and (A19),it is easy to establish that u21 > 1122 implies that t < p(x* --> 0 , i.e., p). Using this inequality in (A19)and (A21)we obtain h1(u22) 1 1 / ( u~~) u22 > u11.
Finally, consider the case u = 1. Then u22 and u1l are uniquely determined by (A17)and (A14),which must hold as equality. u2l and 1112 are not uniquely determined. In particular, we can set u21 = u22 and u12 = ul1.
Q , upper and lower heinicontinuous in ( p , q(', ql"', 0 ) . Then the continuity of ~' ( pu , q ' , q"') 1 follows from Berge's Maximum theorem. Using a similar argument it is easy to establish that G' IC(p q", q"', o ) is continuous in all arguments except at u = 0. The discontinuity may arise because the no-collusio~~ constraint ( A 6 ) in the case of o > 0 and the no-collusion constraint ( A 7 ) in the case of o = 0 are binding, but generically define different subsets in the domain. Specifically, consider the limit of ( A 6 )as u converges to zero:
It coincides with ( A 7 ) only if q' = q"'.
Next, let us show that both G1" (p q', q n C , u ) and G C ( p I q(', q'", o ) are increasing in p. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that G n C ( p lI q", qn', o ) < GnC(p2 q (', ql", o ) for some ( q ' , q"', u ) and p l , p2 E [O, 11 s.t. pl > p2. We will demonstrate an incentive scheme (521, 522, 512, G I ] ) that induces the employee to take effort p2 and refuse to exchange information at a cost to the firm that is less than Gfl"(p2I q ' , q"', o ) .
Let ( u~~, u22, u12, u l l ) be incentive scheme N C ( p q', q'", o ) .
Also, by Lemma 2, 1121 > u22 > u12 2 u11.
Three possible cases need to be considered: (p2) .Note that 522 2 GI2.It is easy to check that incentive scheme (u21, 522, C 1 2 , U I I ) satisfies individual-rationality constraint ( A 5 ) and corresponding no-collusion constraint ( A 6 )or (A7).Consider now the firm's expected cost:
where the first inequality is true by convexity of h(.),the second inequality is true because pl > p2 and u21 > G22 > El2 > u11,and the third inequality is true by assumption.
Case (ii).
where t is chosen to satisfy
In cases (ii) and (iii) it is easy to show that incentive scheme ( E 2 ] , 522, G 1 2 , E L I ) satisfies individual-rationality and no-collusion constraints. Employing the same techniques as in (A23),it can be demonstrated that the expected cost of this incentive scheme is strictly less than G1" '(p2 I q ' , q"', o ) , a contradiction. Thus, G1"(p q", q'", o ) ', q'IC, u ) and V C ( p q C , q'IC, o ) , q'Ic, u ) . ('425) Since both (A24)and (A25)are weakly concave, the set of maximizers of V 1 " ( p I .) (~' ( p I .)) is either a unique effort pn'* ( p C " ) or an interval [ p y x , p g * ] ([p?, p';;] ). In the latter case, the firm's best-response set includes ra~ldoinization between incentive schemes. Thus, the best-response correspondence is convex.
Consider modified gaine M in which firms A and B simulta~leously choose strategies ( p ' , p"', 8) E [0, 113 and (q', q"", o) E [0, 113 respectively, and get the followi~lg payoffs: VnC(qflCp', pnC, 8) + u V C ( q C p", p"', 8) .
Obviously, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the equilibria of game M and the equilibria of the original game. Therefore, the equilibria of the original gaine can be derived as follows: (i) derive the equilibria of the game M, and (ii) compute incentive schemes used in the corresponding equilibrium of the original game by inverting @ ( . ) and (?'LC(.) .
,firm A's best-response set consists of all (p"', p*"", 8') s.t.
p'C E [0, 11 is arbitrary, S' = 0 , and p*"' E argmax, V n " ( p I q C , q"', u ) . If max, , V1"'(p q', q"', u ) 5 Inax, V C ( p1 q ' , qn(', u ) , a similar argument can be used to show that the best response set is convex. Thus, firm A's best-response set is convex. By symmetry, the same must be true for firm B The following lemma establishes the bounds of the interval in which optimal efforts can lie, and shows that a firm will not offer an incentive scheme of class NC when the other employee agrees to exchange i~lformatio~l with a sufficiently small probability, implying that the discontinuity of G n ' ( p I q', q"', u ) 
Lemma A l . Suppose that n 2 2 > nl2. Then 3 pnlln, p'"" € ( 0 , 1) and g > O s.t.
(i) If strategy ( 0 , q', q"') is chosen with a positive probability in some equilibrium, then q" ', q' E [p""", p"'"] (ii) V1"'(p q ' , q n C , u ) i V " ( p q ' , qn", u ) if p 5 pnl",qq" > p""", q"" > pnl"' and u g.
Proof. The lemma will be proved in a sequence of steps Claim 1. 3 p'""' < 1 s.t. if in some equilibrium effort p is taken with a positive probability, then p < pnlaX. Note that G n C ( p1 q L , q1IC, u ) 
and h(.)is convex, limp,l h ( g + D ( p ) ) = x, but the firm's revenue does not exceed n21. This establishes the claim.
Claim2 , pm"l, VC(2q" I p', p'IC, 8) > V C ( qI p C , pIiC, u ) .
Thus, it is sufficient to demonstrate that GC(q2I p", pnC, pfiC, S) is of orderq; when q2 is sufficiently small. Obviously, GC(qI p C , pn', 8) 
GC(qn p', pn', S ) -GC(qi p", pnC, 8)
Since D1(0)= 0 , D1l(0) i x and Izl(g) i x, we conclude that the above expression is of order q;.
Proof of this claim follows the same steps as the proof of claim 2 and is therefore omitted Claim 4. Let pnl'" = min{qc, q"'). If effort p is taken with a positive probability in some equilibrium, then p E [p'"'", p'""". This claim is a simple consequence of claims 1 , 2, 3. and q ' , qrZC E [p'"'", pmax] . It is easy to show that t'p 5 p '""" q', q"' E [p'"'", p'""": Claim 6. Let R n C ( p q ' , qn', 0 ) ( R L " ( p q", q"", o ) ) be the revenue that a firm gets when it offers incentive
This claim follows by inspection. , pm"] . This claim follows from claims 5 and 6 and completes the proof of the lemma.
By Lemmas 2 and 3, W A(.) (WB(.) ) is contilluous everywhere except at o = 0 ( S = 0).Then by Berge's Maximum theorem, the best-response correspo~lde~lces B R A : (q" ', q C , 0 ) + (p"", p', 8) and B R B : (p"", p', 8) -(q"' , q', u ) in game M are upper hemicontinuous except possibly around u = 0 and S = 0.
To establish the upper hemico~lti~luity at 0 = O (8 = 0), note that by (i) of Lemma A1 we can restrict the domain of the best-response correspondence BRA (q"", q', o ) (CC) .It is easy to show that an equilibrium exists in this game. Let us fix any such equilibrium, and show that it is also an equilibrium of the original game. Clearly, firm B has no incentive to deviate. Its strategy is optimal in the class CC by construction, while deviating to an incentive scheme of class NC will only increase its cost. Let q be employee B's expected effort in this equilibrium. 
+ ";/(I -u~) ] D ' ( p l ) .
Since p' 5 p, the expected payment to the employee has decreased.
Since D ( x ) + (1 -x ) D 1 ( x )is increasing in x , we have v h < V H . Then convexity of h ( . )implies that firm A's expected cost decreases as a result of this modification. Thus, we have shown that it is optimal for firm A to induce its employee to agree to exchange information, because it can obtain the same revenue at a lower cost.
To establish existence of an equilibrium, co~lsidera game in which both firms can only offer incentive schemes of class CC. Existence of an equilibrium in this game follows by standard arguments. Compactness of the action space and the regularity conditions imposed on h ( . )and D(.) guarantee that there is a finite number of such equilibria. The previous argument implies that these equilibria are preserved when the firms can also offer incentive schemes of class NC.
Inspecting the proof, it is easy to see that the result holds by continuity for sufficiently small positive K I .
Q.E.D
Derivation of the cost functions in the limited-liability case. To show that G1" '(p q', q"', u ) ', q"', 0 ) 
To compute G L ( p q", qnc,u ) , note that the incentive constraint (A17) and the collusion constraint (A16) imply that it is optimal to set 1112 = 0 and ull = 0. Then using the incentive constraint (A17) we obtain G C ( p q", qfic, o 
